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CINDY STENGER, KIRK WELLER, ILANA ARNON,
ED DUBINSKY, DRAGA VIDAKOVIC

A SEARCH FOR A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH FOR
UNDERSTANDING THE UNCOUNTABLE SET P(N)
RESUMEN. En el presente estudio nos preguntamos si los individuos construyen estructuras
mentales para el conjunto P (N ) que da significado a la expresión “todos los subconjuntos de N ”.
Los aportes de nuestra investigación en relación con esta pregunta tienen dos vertientes.
Primeramente, identificamos las perspectivas constructivistas que han sido o podrían haber sido
utilizadas para describir los mecanismos de pensamiento acerca de los conjuntos infinitos,
en particular el conjunto de los números naturales. Segundo, para determinar si estos mecanismos
de pensamiento de los individuos acerca del conjunto P (N ) pueden ser interpretados en
términos de una o más de las perspectivas consideradas, analizamos la forma de pensar de ocho
matemáticos. Mas allá de las concepciones negativas, o sea, de lo que P (N ) no es, los resultados
de nuestro análisis nos hicieron dudar sobre si la comprensión de los individuos del conjunto
P (N ) se extiende más allá de la definición formal. Hablamos de las posibles implicaciones de
nuestros descubrimientos e indicamos futuros temas de investigación que podrían surgir de este
estudio.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Conjuntos no numerables, APOE, metáfora, conjunto potencia, números
naturales, imágenes mentales.

ABSTRACT. This study considers the question of whether individuals build mental structures for
the set P (N ) that give meaning to the phrase, “all subsets of N .” The contributions of our
research concerning this question are two-fold. First, we identified constructivist perspectives that
have been, or could be used to describe thinking about infinite sets, specifically, the set of natural
numbers N . Second, to determine whether individuals’ thinking about the set P (N ) can be
interpreted in terms of one or more of the perspectives we considered, we analyzed the thinking of
eight mathematicians. Beyond negative conceptions, that is, what P (N ) is not, the results of our
analysis cast doubt on whether individual understanding of the set P (N ) extends beyond the
formal definition. We discuss the possible implications of our findings, and indicate further
research arising from this study.
KEY WORDS: Uncountable sets, APOS, metaphor, power set, natural numbers, mental images.

RESUMO. No presente estudo nos preguntamos se os indivíduos constroem estruturas mentais
para o conjunto P (N ) que dá significado a expressão “todos os subconjuntos de N ”. Os aportes
de nossa investigação em relação a esta pregunta tem duas vertentes. Primeiramente,
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indentificamos as perspectivas construtivistas que seriam ou poderiam ter sido utilizadas para
descobrir os mecanismos de pensamento acerca dos conjuntos infinitos, em particular o conjunto
dos números naturais. Segundo, para determinar se esses mecanismos de pensamento dos
indivíduos em relação ao conjunto P (N ) podem ser interpretados em termos de uma ou mais
das perspectivas consideradas, analisamos a forma de pensar de oito matemáticos. Além das
concepções negativas, isto é, de que P (N ) não é, os resultados de nossas análises trouzeram a
dúvida sobre se os indivíduos compreendem o conjunto P (N ) além da definição formal. Falamos
das possíveis implicações de nossas descobertas e indicamos futuros temas de investigação que
poderão surgir deste estudo.
PALAVRAS CHAVE: Conjuntos não enumeráveis, APOE, metáfora, conjunto potência, números
naturais, imagens mentais.

RÉSUMÉ. Dans cette étude nous nous demandons si les individus construisent des structures
mentales spécifiques pour l’ensemble P (N ) («ensemble des sous-ensembles de N »). Nous
décrivons ici deux des principaux apports de notre recherche en relation à cette question.
Nous identifions tout d’abord les perspectives constructivistes utilisées ou potentiellement
utilisables pour décrire les mécanismes de la pensée à propos des ensembles infinis, et en
particulier l’ensemble des entiers naturels. Ensuite, pour déterminer si ces mécanismes de
pensée des individus sur l’ensemble P (N ) peuvent être interprétés en termes d’une ou plusieurs
des perspectives considérées, nous analysons la forme de penser de huit mathématiciens. Audelà des conceptions négatives, c'est-à-dire les approches de P (N ) essentiellement par ce qu’il
n’est pas, les résultats de notre analyse laissent à penser que la compréhension des individus de
l’ensemble P (N ) n’est va pas au delà de la définition formelle. Nous exposons enfin les possibles
implications de nos résultats et nous soulignons de futurs sujets de recherche que cette étude peut
dégager.
MOTS CLÉS: Ensembles non dénombrables, APOE, métaphore, l’ensemble des parties, entiers
naturels, images mentales.

1. INTRODUCTION
Uncountable infinity is ubiquitous, both explicitly and implicitly, in the
undergraduate mathematics curriculum. Explicitly, undergraduate mathematics
majors study uncountable sets in Introduction to Proof or Transition courses and
again in Analysis courses and upper division courses on set theory. Implicitly,
students must work with uncountable sets in Calculus courses as they study
functions, limits, and Riemann sums, often defined over uncountable domains.
Participation in these courses and in many other situations in the field of
mathematics should lead to constructions of new mental structures for dealing
with uncountable sets. This has been true since G. Cantor began the
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development of the mathematical theory of infinite sets in the latter part of
the 19th century. In these situations, the learner must grapple with the profound
idea that there are different levels of infinity, proofs of uncountability, the
continuum hypothesis, the fact that 2ℵ > ℵ for any cardinal number ℵ and
the relationship between ordinal and cardinal numbers. If our students are to
understand, appreciate, and even further the development of these ideas, they
must have an understanding of both countable and uncountable infinite sets.

Nevertheless, mathematics textbooks regularly define uncountable as not
countable. For a set A , one can show that any injective function f : A → P ( A)
from a set A to its power set P( A) cannot be surjective (see, for example,
Chartrand, Polimeni, & Zhang, 2007). Applied to the set of natural numbers N ,
it follows that no bijective function can be defined between N and its power set
P (N ) . Therefore, the uncountability of the set P (N ) is rooted in its not being
countable. It is not surprising then that students and even some mathematicians
do not have a description of what P (N ) is and try to find one by generalizing
from properties of finite sets or countable infinite sets. Although knowing
what something “is not” is a valuable part of conceptual understanding, most
specialists in mathematics education, as well as many mathematicians, would
deem an exclusively “negative” view of a concept as insufficient.
One way logicians try to construct an uncountable set, for example P (N ) ,
the power set of the natural numbers N , is to build a binary tree. The
construction involves an iterative process, where any given step can be described
recursively. However, no subset of N arises by completing a particular step of
the process, nor is any subset constructed by determining the resultant state
of the process (to use the language of Lakoff and Núñez, 2000). To construct a
subset of N , one must first complete the tree (mentally speaking) and then
traverse a particular path. No systematic procedure, iterative or otherwise, has
been devised for constructing all the paths through the tree. Thus, the binary
tree does not enable an individual to make explicit the meaning of the phrase
all subsets of N .
This begs the question of whether some concepts in mathematics, such as
uncountability, are exclusively formal. In terms of the notions of concept image
and concept definition (Tall and Vinner, 1981), the concept image of the set
P (N ) , would, if purely formal, be essentially void. According to Vinner
(1991), this is an insufficient basis for understanding. He writes: “To know by
heart a concept definition does not guarantee understanding of the concept. To
understand … means to have a concept image” (p. 69). Thus, from a
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constructivist perspective, conceptual understanding cannot rest exclusively on
knowledge of the formal definition. In reality, one’s concept image is never
completely void; the words of a formal mathematical definition would, at
the very least, evoke certain images, connect with previous experiences, or
suggest informal descriptions. The issue, then, is the degree to which one’s
concept image informs the meaning of the concept definition. For the set P (N ) ,
the question is whether one can identify mental structures that offer insight
into the meaning of what “all subsets of N ” is, as opposed to what it is not.
The answer to this question does not appear in the current literature.
Although literature on the learning of concepts of infinity is vast (for a partial
list of relevant sources, see Dubinsky, Weller, McDonald, & Brown, 2005a,
2005b), most studies concern the comparison of infinite sets (e.g., Tall, 1980;
Tirosh, 1999; Tsamir, 1999), the contradictory nature of infinity concepts (e.g.,
Fischbein, Tirosh, & Hess, 1979; Moreno & Waldegg, 1991; Tirosh, 1991),
or historical/epistemological obstacles encountered in the conceptualization of
infinite sets (e.g., Sierpinska & Viwegier, 1989; Jahnke, 2001).
Few authors have tried to elaborate mental structures an individual or group
of individuals might use in developing concepts of countable sets. Exceptions
include Lakoff and Núñez (2000), Tall (2001), Dubinsky et al. (2005a, 2005b),
Stenger, Vidakovic, and Weller (2005), and Brown, McDonald, and Weller (in
press). Moreover, no source of which we are aware considers the development
of mental structures for uncountable sets such as P (N ) .
Cantor (1941) struggled against the fact that no one had mental structures
for any infinite sets. His work led to the development of such mental
structures for countable sets. Our research set out to find mental structures that
give meaning to the concept of P (N ) , a meaning that goes beyond the formal
definition. Dubinsky et al. (2005b) remark that most discussions of infinite
processes in the literature, such as those found in Aristotle’s writings (according
to Moore, 1999) and recently in Tirosh’s study (Tirosh, 1999) all involve
iteration. Dubinsky et al. (2005b) propose that this might explain some
difficulties that even contemporary students have with concepts of infinity. For
example, some teachers of calculus feel that of the two formulations of the limit
concept:
For all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that if 0 <| x − a |< δ , then | f ( x) − L |< ε
and
For all n ∈ N , there exists δ > 0 such that if 0 <| x − a |< δ , then | f ( x) − L |<

1
n
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students tend to find the second easier to understand than the first. The
authors suggest that this might be because the students can understand the
meaning of “For all n” as an iterative process, whereas no such process
is apparent regarding “For all ε > 0 ”. The authors suggest that if there is no
apparent mental process underlying one’s conception of a set, as may be the case
with uncountable sets, the meaning of “all” is not entirely clear.

So we asked our question in a slightly different way. Does the literature
include constructivist perspectives that might describe the development of
mental structures for uncountable sets such as P ( N ) ? We found several
candidates. Though not exhaustive, our list is representative. The perspectives
cover a range of activities, such as visualization, imaging, intuition, metaphor,
language, and reflective abstraction. These perspectives either have been,
or could be, used to describe thinking about countable sets (in our case, the
set of natural numbers N ). This raises the question of whether any of
these perspectives could be extended to explain individual thinking about the
uncountable set P ( N ) . To offer at least a tentative answer, we conducted
interviews with eight mathematicians and examined whether they
constructed mental structures for P ( N ) that support the formal definition.
Although we did not consider every possible constructivist perspective, those we
considered encompassed our subjects’ responses to the following queries:
“Describe your thinking about the set N ,” and “Describe your thinking about
the set P ( N ) .”
Before proceeding, we make several additional points. First, this report is
only a preliminary investigation of P ( N ) . Our conclusions are tentative, and our
interpretations are not absolute.
The second point involves the meaning of the terms constructivism and
mental structure. Although universal agreement on all aspects of the meaning
of constructivism eludes the mathematical and mathematical education
communities, it is generally considered that constructivism includes the
notion that learning mathematics involves the construction of mathematical
concepts in the minds of individuals, groups of individuals, or societies of
individuals1. This does not mean that mathematical concepts are directly
constructed. Rather, a learner constructs certain structures in her or his mind to
make sense of mathematical problem situations. Thus, we offer the following,
1

We include groups and societies of individuals to reflect the fact that in our work we
look for mental structures and their sources both in individuals (e.g., Weller et al,
2003) and in social interactions (e.g., Vidakovic, 1997; Vidakovic & Martin, 2004).
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not so much as a precise definition, but rather a framework for the perspectives
used in our analysis.
A mental structure is any relatively stable (although capable of
development) structure (i.e., something constructed in one’s mind) that an
individual uses to make sense of mathematical situations. A source
for a mental structure is a description of where that structure comes from.
A mental mechanism is a means by which that structure might develop in
the mind(s) of an individual or a group of individuals.

The last point concerns the significance of this study. Specifically, why is a
purely formal definition of a concept insufficient, at least for students? In a study
of 70 mathematicians’ thinking styles, and the social, intuitive, and aesthetic
aspects of their learning, Burton (2001) found that her subjects valued
meaningful, connected, and insightful explanations in their own work. On the
other hand, she associated current disillusionment, both in school and university
mathematics teaching, with a lack of meaning, connection, and insight.
Many teachers of mathematics, interested in helping their students to build
mental structures to make sense of formal mathematical ideas, share this
constructivist viewpoint.
In consideration of the issues just mentioned and the perspectives that
guided our analysis, we pose the following research question: Did our subjects
appear to build mental structures for the uncountable set P ( N ) that give
meaning to the phrase “all subsets of N ”?

2. RELATED LITERATURE: PERSPECTIVES USED IN OUR ANALYSIS
In this section, we briefly describe perspectives that might be relevant to our
research question. We examine how each perspective explains, or could be used
to explain, thinking about infinity. We do not discuss here how each perspective
might, or might not, explain individual thinking about P ( N ) , as this is the goal
of the section on data analysis.
2.1. Visualization
In our search through the literature on visualization, we concentrated on
Presmeg (1985, 1986, 1998), Fischbein (1987), Zimmermann and Cunningham
(1991), Dreyfus (1991, 1995), and Wheatly (1991), as well as references listed
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in those articles. According to these authors, a visual image can be used to
organize one’s mathematical thinking. Thus, it serves as a mental structure.
In the view of some authors (e.g., Rodd, 2000), an individual constructs “spatial
mental schemes” that are used as mathematical warrants. According to others
(e.g., Kidron, 2003), visual activities, including computerized visualization,
enhance the understanding of formal mathematics. Still, others (e.g., Zazkis,
Dubinsky, & Dautermann, 1996) report that visual images contribute to analytic
understandings, and vice-versa. In any case, the sources of visual images are the
perceptual reports to an individual’s brain of that which is physically visualized,
and the mental mechanisms are the operations for converting perceptions
to mental images.
Although visualization could be incorporated in the next perspective on
mental images (see Piaget & Inhelder, 1971)2, we have chosen to consider
visualization separately and only in the case where the source is a direct physical
perception (or the memory of one).
In our review of the literature on visualization, we did not find any
investigations on the use of visual image as a mental structure for countable sets.
On one hand, this is not entirely unexpected. An infinite phenomenon cannot be
directly visualized because the physical operation of perceptual mechanisms is
necessarily finite.
On the other hand, perceptual reports are interpreted by the mind, and, as
Zazkis et al. (1996) found, visual and analytic thinking develop in tandem. Thus,
one could imagine a learner visualizing a finite phenomenon and extending,
in her or his mind, the finite phenomenon to an infinite one. This could lead
to an understanding of a mathematical concept related to infinity. In a sense, a
start in this direction has been made by Tirosh (1999) and Tsamir (1999), who
considered the effect on students’ understandings of the cardinalities of
certain countable sets when (the initial terms of) these sets were presented either
vertically or horizontally.
2.2. Mental images
Davis and Maher (1997) assert that mathematical concepts arise from mental
images that are rooted in experiences (see also Hadamard, 1945; Aspinwall,
2

Piaget distinguishes between reproductive and anticipatory imagery. Reproductive
imagery refers to reproducing in one’s mind that which has already been encountered.
Anticipatory imagery refers to that which is not perceived by the senses.
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Shaw, & Presmeg, 1997; Goldenberg, 1988; Sfard, 1997). Higher level concepts
are developed by modifying old images or creating new ones based on existing
images. In this way, new knowledge is constructed from previous knowledge.
Thus, mental images are mental structures. The sources of mental images consist
of experiences and previously constructed images, and the mental mechanisms
are the processes used to transform those experiences into images or to
create new images. More sophisticated mathematical concepts arise by
developing more sophisticated human experiences, such as notational systems
representing mathematical operations. Although the literature on mental
images does not specifically mention the development of infinite sets, one could
conjecture that mental images for such sets might be created by associating a
notational system to the process of counting or set formation.

2.3. Intuitive insights
Fischbein et al. (1979) characterize intuition as knowledge that is “direct,
global, and self-evident” (p. 5). According to Hersh (1997), intuition arises
through the examination and manipulation of existing mental or physical objects.
At an elementary level, this entails transformation of physical objects. At a more
advanced level, one transforms mental objects in an effort to solve mathematical
problems. In either case, the experience of transforming objects, whether
physical or mental, creates what Hersh calls a mental trace, a mental
structure that enables an individual to achieve new insights that often lead to the
formation of new mathematical structures. Once developed, the individual
seeks to identify the properties of these new objects. At this point, the
individual uses mathematical proof to verify and to understand the properties
identified. The sources for intuition are the experiences that originate from
repeated examination and manipulation of physical and/or mental objects. The
transformation of experience serves as a mental mechanism that leads to
the formation of a mental trace.
Subconscious reflection, when applied to this mental structure, serves as a
mental mechanism from which new insight, or intuition, arises. The new
intuition, through further reflection and/or transformation, may lead to the
creation of new mental objects or new intuitions.
In the case of the natural numbers, according to Hersh, the concept of
counting is achieved by manipulating concrete objects. One becomes aware
of the infinitude of the natural numbers by realizing that they can never be
completely counted. Specifically, no matter what number is named, one can
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name a higher number. This is the basis of the successor function, which leads to
a conception of N as a single structure.
2.4. Semiotics
In their research on language and mathematics, Cobb, Boufi, McClain, and
Whitenack (1997), Cobb, Yackel, and McClain (2000), Sfard (1998), and Tall et
al. (2001) discuss the interplay between mental processes and mental objects,
structures that underlie the formation of mathematical conceptions. Tall et al.
(2001) explain that symbols serve as pivots between process and object.
Sfard (1998) asserts that mathematical objects do not exist without the use of
signifiers. Cobb, Boufi, et al. (1997), Cobb, Yackel, et al. (2000), and Sfard
(1998) consider classroom discourse and symbolization as mental mechanisms
that support reflective shifts in discourse between mental structures such as
processes and objects.
Many authors, such as Vygotsky (1981), Ernest (1997, 1998), and Rotman
(1988, 1993, 2000), consider mathematics to be a language. Mathematical
concepts are expressed in an individual’s mind in terms of that language,
considered by Chomsky (2006), among others, to be a mental structure. The
source of the semiotic perspective is social discourse about mathematical
situations, based on the idea that language is also a mental mechanism
that molds thought (Vygotsky, 1978). Rotman (1988, 1993, 2000) also notes that
symbols embody thought. He refers to the creative power of discourse
and verbal exchange of thought, both oral and written. Specifically,
mathematical learning involves the interplay of symbols, signs, proof, and
mathematical objects within the social experiences of the individual learner.
Similarly, Ernest (1997, 1998) asserts that language enables the formulation
of mathematical ideas.
Given that social experiences occur within a finite context, Rotman (1993)
believes that infinite sets should be discarded from mathematics because they are
physically unrealizable. Tall (2005), on the other hand, sees semiotics playing an
important role in one’s understanding of infinity. For instance, he explains that
the “potentially infinite processes of sequences, series, and the calculus”
take their toll on students who do not have semiotic resources from which to
draw since one can never reach a limit in one’s lifetime. Despite this view, he
does not offer an explicit description for the development of mental structures
for infinite sets via symbolism.
Beyond Tall, no explicit theory or discussion within the semiotics literature
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seems to relate to the development of mental structures for infinite sets.
Obviously such a development could not be based on the strictly finitist
interpretation of Rotman. Yet, others who believe that such a development is
possible would need to determine how the use of language, symbols, and/or
signs might be extended to help learners understand infinite processes that are
not physically realizable.
2.5. Metaphors
Although there are many variations on the use of metaphors in the development
of mathematical understanding (e.g., Fischbein, 2001; Sfard, 1994), we shall
focus on the notion of conceptual metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Núñez
(2000), since they explicitly apply the mental structure of metaphor to infinite
sets. In general, they define conceptual metaphors as “grounded, inferencepreserving, cross-domain mappings” in which individuals “use the inferential
structure of one conceptual domain to reason about another” (p. 6). Thus,
metaphorical thinking involves the formulation of new situations in terms of
more familiar contexts. In this way, the learner constructs new concepts. The
sources for such thinking are the original situations that give rise to metaphors
as mental structures. The “cross-domain mappings” serve as the mental
mechanisms.
According to Lakoff and Núñez, many infinity concepts involve application
of the Basic Metaphor of Infinity (BMI). With this mental structure, the
individual imposes on an unending process, conceptualized iteratively, a unique,
final resultant state. In this way, an individual thinks of an unending process in
terms of a finite process, which necessarily has a last term. For the countable
set N , an individual begins with an initial state (Step 0), the empty set. Step 1
consists of taking the union of the set {1} with the empty set. In general, the
process is described recursively: For an arbitrary step n , one forms the set
{1,2,…, n} by taking the union of the set {1,2,…, n − 1} with the set {n} .
Through application of the BMI, the individual imposes on the unending process
a unique final state, in this case, the set N .
2.6. APOS Theory
Actions, processes, objects and schemas are all mental structures (e.g.,
Asiala et al., 1996; Dubinsky & McDonald, 2001). The sources for actions are
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external stimuli that specify a transformation of objects; for processes the
sources are actions which are interiorized to processes; for objects the sources
are processes which are encapsulated into objects; and for schemas the
sources are previously constructed actions, process, objects, and schemas
that are developed in stages called a triad (Piaget & Garcia, 1989; Cooley,
Trigueros, & Baker, in press), and organized into a coherent whole. The mental
mechanisms are operations such as interiorization, encapsulation, coordination
(composition), and reversal. Recent studies by Dubinsky et al. (2005a, 2005b)
have investigated how this perspective can be used to explain mathematical
situations involving infinity, particularly the relationship between potential and
actual infinity. These authors suggest that “potential infinity is the conception
of the infinite as a process,” and that “actual infinity is the mental object
obtained through encapsulation of that process” (p. 346).
In an empirical study on infinite iteration, Brown et al. (in press) offer a
description of the mental construction of infinite iterative processes (an instance
of potential infinity) and their encapsulations (an instance of actual infinity). To
construct mentally the natural numbers N , an individual might begin, as with
metaphors, by performing a small number of iterations, for instance, writing or
speaking about a sequence of finite sets such as {1}, {1,2}, {1,2,3} . These actions
are then interiorized into a finite mental process. To obtain the first n counting
numbers, one adds 1 to n − 1 , and adjoins the resulting natural number n to
the set {1,2,…, n − 1} . Coordination of multiple instantiations of this finite
process leads to construction of an infinite iterative process. Here, the similarity
with metaphors ends. Once the process is viewed as complete (i.e., an
understanding that each step yields a set of the form {1,2,…, n} ), and as a totality
(i.e., an ability to see all of the steps in the process as a single, atemporal
operation), the process may be encapsulated as the result of an action, or
attempted action, being applied to it. In the case of infinite iteration, this might
be an action of evaluation, for instance, “What do I have?” or “What comes
next?” The former action involves accumulation: the object that arises from the
encapsulation consists of the totality of objects produced by each step of
the process. The latter action is extensive: encapsulation leads to construction
of a successor object that appears “next”. In some instances, both actions may
yield the same object. In others, different objects may arise. In either case, the
resulting object “stands outside” the process; it is not produced by completion
of any step. For this reason, Brown et al. (in press) refer to the object obtained
by encapsulating an infinite iterative process as a transcendent object.
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2.7. Mathematical formalism
According to Dubinsky (2000), formalism guides the development of mental
structures in some mathematical situations. That is, one uses the syntax of a
formal statement in a conscious manner to direct specific constructions of
actions, processes, objects, and schemas. In other words, the formal statement
of the concept motivates the development of certain mental structures. MacLane
(1981) asserts that mathematics consists of applying rigor and deduction to
ordinary human experiences so as to uncover hidden properties. Tall (2001)
concurs, stating that “we reflect on our perceptions to create new cognitive
images within our personal cognitive structures” (p. 220). For each of these
perspectives, formalism is a mental mechanism that leads to the development of
certain mental structures. MacLane (1986) suggests that the set N (among other
mathematical entities) arises from the human activities of counting and listing.
One then applies the rigor of Peano’s Postulates to prove the standard arithmetic
properties for N . In a similar vein, Tall (2001) asserts that individuals begin
with a concept image of the set of natural numbers, and then apply Peano’s
Postulates as a formalism, which, he argues, leads to more subtle visual imagery
(see also Zazkis et al., 1996).

3. METHODOLOGY
In exploring the mental structures individuals might build for the set P ( N ) ,
we discussed the issue with eight mathematicians. The eight subjects represented
diverse mathematical interests, with one logician among the group. Subjects
were asked two questions, “What is your conception of the natural
numbers N ?”, and “What is your conception of the power set of the natural
numbers, P ( N ) ?” For the set N , we did not expect to find anything new.
Questions about N served two purposes: to determine how the selected
perspectives could be used to explain individual thinking about infinite sets;
and to serve as a baseline for the analysis of our subjects’ thinking about P ( N ) .
For both questions, the interviewers first posed the question, and allowed each
subject to describe her or his thinking. The interviewers asked follow-up
questions to clarify a subject’s responses, or to probe further into a subject’s
thinking. With the exception of one interview, conducted as an email discussion,
each interview lasted about one hour, was audio-taped, transcribed verbatim,
and then checked for accuracy.

A SEARCH FOR A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING

105

Following the steps of data analysis set forth in Asiala et al. (1996), we
scripted each of the transcripts. In the script, the interview was organized into a
two-column format, where the first column contained the original transcript,
and the second short statements used to sketch interview passages. Then,
we prepared a table of contents to formulate a list of issues, identifying
instances where a given perspective might apply. Two of the authors reviewed
each interview, noting evidence of thinking that aligned with a particular
perspective. Evidence consisted of identifying specific phrases that reflected the
construction, attempted construction, or use of mental structures associated with
a particular perspective. We also looked for, but did not find, any evidence of
perspectives other than those we selected for study in this paper. The two
reviewers negotiated differences and shared their findings with the entire team.
This approach served two purposes: triangulation of results and reliability. In the
presentation of the data, the reader will note that there is not always a sharp
distinction between different perspectives. Thus, we do not assert that our
subjects’ statements reflect a single perspective exclusively. Rather, we are
interested in whether a given perspective might be used to describe a subject’s
thinking about N and/or P ( N ) . Specifically, did the subject give evidence of
evoking, constructing, or trying to construct, a mental structure for the set P ( N )
that would infuse the formal definition with greater meaning?

4. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Eight subjects, Claudia, Cecil, Doris, Ian, Kathryn, Marcus, Quinn, and Ranae3,
participated in the study. For each perspective, we summarize the subjects’
thinking, and present representative excerpts to illustrate our claims. As noted
earlier, none of the results for the set N is new. We included an analysis of this
set to determine the applicability of a given perspective, and to serve as a
baseline for our analysis of P ( N ) , the main focus of our investigation.

4.1 Visualization
For the set N , six of the eight mathematicians described the set N using a
visual representation. For instance, Claudia, Ian, Doris, Marcus, and Quinn
3

Pseudonyms have been used for all of the interview subjects.
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referred to the number line. The following excerpt from Marcus, in response to
the question of how he thinks about N , is representative:
Marcus:

I guess I just think about the real number line. I always see that ole’ one up
above the board, back when I was in grade school, that’s just what I think
of, obviously the right hand side.

This finite visual image was a likely source for development of his mental
structure of N . He builds N by successively adding one at each step:
Marcus:

I’ve got the number 1 … and I guess I just interpret it in terms of the
operation of addition. I think of one plus one, one plus one plus one, and so
forth … that’s about the way I think of it.

As noted earlier, a direct visual perception cannot record an infinite
phenomenon. To construct the set N , Marcus’ visual representation evoked a
process of finite enumeration that, when extended, indicated successive
additions of 1, ad infinitum. Thus, the visual representation served as a
source for the formation of an iterative process, a mechanism Marcus used to
build a mental structure for the set N .
Unlike N , none of the mathematicians in our study recounted direct
physical visualizations as sources for P ( N ) . For instance, no subject referred to
the real line as an infinite set of points to which each element of P ( N )
corresponds.
4.2 Mental images
All but one of the eight subjects described a mental image for an initial finite
segment of the set N . For instance, Ranae reveals an image of N as a sequence
of numerals:
Ranae:

... my mental image ... is just starting to see the list of them. I mean like the
sequence of numbers ... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, whatever.

Similarly, Cecil starts with a visual image of falling dominoes that serves as
a source for his mental image of N as a “bundle of stuff”:
Cecil:

Uhh ... dominoes ... but that’s pretty much all. It’s just ... uh ... and sort of in
your mind, the successor function. You’ve gotta start and you go from one
place to another. ... When you’re all done you sort of back off and say OK
there’s this big set of things and given any point you can move to any other
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point and they’re ordered uh, but uh, in some other situations you want to
think of them as just a bundle of stuff that you can get around in.

For Cecil, falling dominoes indicated enumeration, the basis of the
successor function. The successor function served as a mental mechanism
that conjured an image of N as “a bundle of stuff,” a totality where “given any
point you can move to another point.”
Four of the eight subjects offered mental images of P ( N ) . For instance,
Kathryn saw P ( N ) as “very, very big, in some sense unknowable.” Similarly,
Doris saw P ( N ) as a “quagmire”:
Doris:

Yeah, so as soon as you said that, I’m like oh! yes, that’s the ... I really think
I just, as far as how I conceive of it, it’s just the definition, so I’m just
looking at all the subsets, it’s just this quagmire of subsets [both laugh]. As
far as a mental image, that’s what I’ve got.

Ian used his remembered experience with tree structures, likely obtained
from physical images, or in writing computer programs, to construct a mental
structure represented mathematically as a recursive process. However, the
process he describes only yields finite subsets of N .
Ian:

Well, let’s see, I guess I would do it recursively in sort of ... think of a tree
process I suppose. I would have a set with one up through k whatever k
is. You have a start, and so then I would throw, go up one level and throw in
k + 1 , so now you’d have one plus k through one. And then I would go
down a level putting k + 1 together with everything that was in the original
set from one to k .

At each recursive level k , Ian built the power set of the set {1,2,..., k } .
Although this process yields all of the finite elements of P (N ) , no infinite
elements of P (N ) arise. Ian eventually realizes this, and sees that something
more is needed. Part of his difficulty stems from his belief that an infinite
process can never be finished in one’s mind4.
I:
4

Could you talk a little more about the finishing of this process? What does it
mean at least to you mentally to finish this up, to get everything?

In the excerpts, “I” denotes the interviewer, although various interviews were
conducted by different members of the RUMEC (Research in Undergraduate
Mathematics Education Community) infinity research team. The research team includes
the authors of this paper plus Michael McDonald and Anne Brown.
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Ian:

I:

Ian:

Means really nothing to me. I would never finish it. This tree can get just as
high as you need it to get. You give me a finite place you want it to reach
and I can reach that. And that finite place can be as large as you want to
make it but it would never finish. I really don’t know; don’t have much of a
concept of finishing that as such at all.
But go back to the set of natural numbers. Do you not have a concept of
finishing that process and therefore you really can’t have the set of natural
numbers?
I have no real concept of finishing that process either. Again, natural
numbers ... those things ... there’s no end to it, so I can build you ... I can
give you the set, list physically the elements of the set as high as you want
me to go and if you want me to go higher, I’ll go higher. But no, there’s no
sense to me at least of finishing listing the set of natural numbers or just of
the set of natural numbers. I think of as being endless. There is no finishing
to them.

For Ian, the mental image of a tree is consistent with, and may contribute
to, his belief that an infinite set cannot be created. Just as the tree would never
be complete, the mental structure he attempted to build for P (N ) would
never be complete.
For Doris and Kathryn, their vague images may have helped them to see
“all” as an immense, seemingly indescribable collection. However, neither
image led to formation of a mental structure, nor did their images offer a precise
sense of the difference in magnitude between the two sets N and P (N ) . For
the set N , mental images served as sources for the development of iterative
processes (e.g., Cecil) that inspired use of the successor function, a mechanism
leading to a view of the natural numbers as a totality. In contrast, mental images
for P (N ) did not serve as sources for the development of mental structures. For
example, Doris’ view of P (N ) as a “quagmire” left her with “just the
definition.”
4.3. Intuitive insights
According to Hersh (1997), the “fundamental intuition of the natural numbers”
is a “shared concept, an idea held in common after manipulating coins, bricks,
buttons, and pebbles” (p. 65). In describing their thinking about N , seven of the
eight subjects mentioned counting or manipulating physical objects. This
“shared concept” was a common source, motivating the development of mental
mechanisms, that is, ways of conceiving the endless nature of enumeration. For
instance, Claudia described N as “the collection of things 1, 2, 3, and I could
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keep counting as long as I wanted to”; Cecil thought of N as “the description
of a process”; and Quinn saw N as a progression that “continues and there is no
end.” These types of intuitions appeared to inspire more formal descriptions of
infinite enumeration, such as “the successor function” (Cecil), or an infinite
sequence of repeated additions of 1 (Claudia, Marcus, Ranae). Further reflection
on the process of successively adding 1 led to an intuitive view of N as a
complete mental structure. According to Claudia, such intuitions precede one’s
ability to think of N more formally:
Claudia:
I:
Claudia:
I:
Claudia:

Somehow you have to know in advance what the integers are before you can
take the union over all the finite truncations of the natural numbers.
Why do you need to know in advance what they are?
It’s that I don’t know what the collection of all those finite segments of the
natural numbers is unless I know what the set of natural numbers is.
OK, so what I hear you say is that you don’t see intuitively how you get
from the formation of all these finite sets to the whole set.
I don’t see how I can do that without having an intuitive picture of the
whole set.

For our subjects, counting and manipulating physical objects served as a
source for intuitive conceptions that eventually led to the development of
structures such as the successor function. These more formal structures were
used as mental mechanisms to develop mental structures to inform conceptions
of what N is.
Our subjects’ intuitions regarding the set P (N ) were just the opposite,
rooted in experiences of what P (N ) is not. This certainly seemed to be the case
for Doris, whose repeated efforts to enumerate the set of all subsets of N
ultimately failed:
Doris:

I:
Doris:

I used to love when I was young sitting there and trying to list out all
the subsets of some finite set, and I could just see myself doing this with the
natural numbers, and I could see that I wouldn’t get done, and I knew that.
Yeah, I know what you mean, I did that too.
And I’m not sure at what point, I know it was pretty late along the line,
when I realized that even if I did keep doing that, that when I was done, I
would have missed some or something.

When asked to describe P (N ) , several subjects (Claudia, Ian, Ranae, and
Marcus) attempted to construct iterative processes to obtain P (N ) . Their use
of iteration likely arose from prior experiences with countable collections where
iterative processes abound. However, as Claudia realized, “I’d end up with
the set of all finite subsets.” Her insight, spontaneous and not the result of any
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deductive or inductive reasoning, suggests intuitive thinking. This intuition
helped her to see the error in her construction.
Cecil invoked another familiar intuition regarding uncountable sets. When
asked to describe a construction for P (N ) , he quickly rejected the possibility.
Repeated experiences with countable processes, rendering only countable
collections, helped formulate an intuition that uncountable sets cannot be
obtained from countable processes:
I:

Cecil:

In the same spirit as the process that constructed a single infinite set ...
Could we step it up one more level so that it could be used to construct all of
the subsets of N ?
Back in the old days, there’s this little part that says the power set has a
higher cardinality than the set you started with, and therefore, I’m pretty
sure I can’t prove it anytime soon (laughter). Given a long time, I might
be able to, but the power set is of higher cardinality. If you’re countable
here, you’re not going to be countable there.

For the set N , repeated experiences with counting served as a source for
intuitions regarding the unending nature of enumeration. This resulted in
development of more formal mechanisms. For most of the subjects, seeing the
set N as a completed structure arose from infinite application of the successor
function, or a process of repeatedly adding 1. Intuitions underlying the set P (N )
worked differently. On the basis of unsuccessful attempts to list the subsets of
N , Doris concluded that the elements of P (N ) cannot be listed. Prior
knowledge about the uncountability of P (N ) informed Cecil’s belief that
P (N ) cannot be constructed iteratively. Experiences with iterative processes
led several of the subjects to realize the futility of their attempts to
construct P (N ) . None generated an intuition from which a stable mental
structure for P (N ) arose. As Kathryn pointed out, “I think of P (N ) as … in
some sense unknowable.” This begs the question: Are intuitions of P (N )
necessarily rooted in terms of what P (N ) is not?

4.4. Semiotics
Three of the eight subjects used symbol and language in ways suggested by the
semiotics perspective. As a list, Ranae claimed that no one can see all of
the natural numbers at once. In accordance with Sfard’s (1998) description,
Ranae used a signifier, the letter N , to see the totality of the natural numbers:
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In an abstract way we can see all of them [the natural numbers] at once with
capital N , that’s it, you know? That’s kind of like the embodiment of them.
So you see that big N and that is the natural numbers and ... and so you’re
seeing the set of natural numbers.

For Ranae, the symbol N served as a mental mechanism for construction
of a mental structure for the set of all natural numbers. The list of numerals
appeared to be a source for her thinking.
For Doris, the list of the first few natural numbers served as a pivot between
process and object.
I:
Doris:
I:
Doris:
I:
Doris:
I:
Doris:
I:
Doris:

So, you said one comma two comma three comma, etcetera...
That’s what I said.
What does that mean, “etcetera”?
Oh, I just see more numbers.
How far?
Depends on how far I look.
As far as you want to?
Oh, probably [both laugh].
Okay, then, how do you get from that description to the set of all natural
numbers?
Oh no, that’s the set of all natural numbers.

With the list as symbol, Doris could pivot, as Tall et al. (2001) suggest,
between the process of writing out the list as far as she wished, and the set of all
natural numbers as an object.
Our subjects did not construct P (N ) as a mental structure using the
semiotics perspective. For example, Ian generated subsets of N recursively by
listing the elements of the power set P({1,2,…, n}) for successive values of n .
However, this process only yields the finite subsets of N . Although Doris
discussed difficulties her students encountered with P (N ) , she focused on the
manner in which symbol notation for sets (e.g., braces { } ) distracts rather
than helps students who have difficulty understanding the concept of set:
Doris:

The students aren’t clear about sets in the first place and you start stumbling
over the notation and somehow those braces appear.

For several of our subjects, symbolization served as a mental mechanism
that supported reflective shifts in discourse that contributed to construction
of the set N as a mental structure. The excerpts tell a different story for P (N ) :
none of our subjects used semiotics in ways suggested by the semiotics
perspective to construct a mental structure for this set.
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4.5. Metaphors and APOS Theory
We consider these two perspectives together, in part because of similarities in
the transition from finite to infinite iteration, but, more importantly, to highlight
differences. When considering the transition from finite to infinite iteration
in the countably infinite case, the BMI and APOS Theory appear similar.
For instance, the following excerpts from Claudia, Ranae, and Quinn could
be interpreted using either perspective:
Claudia:

Ranae:
Quinn:

I can start with the set containing just 1 and then I can start with the set
containing 1 and its successor 2, and now I’m going to make some kind of
informal application of an inductive scheme.
I mean like whatever the first number that I have I add one to it, you know
given any number down the line add one to it you get the next one.
Any repetitive thing that you see that you can do forever, you rarely
continue with it. You usually stop and say, I can do this as long as
necessary for me to have more numbers.

Claudia’s use of the phrase “inductive scheme,” Ranae’s comment that
“given any number down the line add one to it,” and Quinn’s description of the
construction as a “repetitive thing that you see that you can do forever,”
exemplify a transition from finite to infinite iteration. According to APOS
Theory, this transition occurs by application of the mental mechanisms of
interiorization and coordination. Specifically, the actions of performing the first
few steps are interiorized into a mental process, and then multiple instantiations
of that process (with different initial and terminal points) are coordinated to form
an infinite iterative process. For instance, interiorization and coordination lead to
development of an inductive scheme. According to Lakoff and Núñez (2000),
the mental mechanism of the BMI facilitates the transition. After construction
of the initial state, and the first step arising from the initial state, one constructs
an infinite process that produces any intermediate state from its predecessor.
Claudia’s inductive scheme could be interpreted as a process that yields any
intermediate state. At this point, the similarities end. Yet, the distinction is
very subtle. In the case of the BMI, the final resultant state arises by
metaphorically conceptualizing the infinite process as if it were a process
with a last term. In the case of APOS Theory, the resultant state arises through
encapsulation, which occurs as one applies an action to the process as a
completed whole. Of the five subjects who gave evidence of constructing N
by iteration, none appeared to think of N metaphorically. For instance, Claudia
and Ranae refer to specific actions:
I:

What I understood you said is that you form the singleton 1, {1,2}, {1,2,3}
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and you continue with that and then after you’ve built all of those …
Then I take the union.
The limit of this sequence [she is referring to {1}, {1,2}, {1,2,3}, …] would
be the natural numbers … you know, if you are looking at it as a sequence
of sets.

Claudia encapsulates her iterative process in response to the action of taking
the union. Ranae also makes an encapsulation, but thinks in terms of a limit. In
her interview, Doris, who sees N as “all of it being there,” creates a unifying
structure that encompasses the objects produced by each step. In each of
these cases, the resultant state, the set N , transcends any step of the process
from which it arises. Thus, APOS Theory seems to explain more readily how the
subjects built mental structures for N .
For P (N ) , as with the other perspectives considered thus far, the situation
was far different. Although several subjects used iterative processes in their
attempts to build mental structures for P (N ) , none was successful. In fact,
the subjects described processes whose final resultant states were only the finite
subsets of N . The following excerpt from Claudia’s interview represents
one such example:
Claudia:
I:
Claudia:
I:
Claudia:

I could take the empty set, then I could look at all the singletons, then I
could look at all the doubletons, is that the right?
Two element sets.
Two element sets, then I could look at all the three element sets.
And if you did that forever?
I would end up with ... No I would not end up with all the subsets, because
the set of all even integers is a subset but I’m not gonna pick that one up as a
finite subset.

Ranae, possessing only an action structure (in terms of APOS), resorts to
“hand waving” in her attempt to describe the elements of P (N ) :
Ranae:

Ranae:

Um ... so you take ... it isn’t like you can just add one to it. Well the trouble
is though there’s other subsets than these so ... I mean because there’s also
{2,3} and there’s also {3,4} and there’s also {6,7} and there’s also {21,29}
You know, I was only thinking of finite subsets though ... to be honest ...
and see ... I can’t, unless I take a class that’s called “infinite” and don’t
bother with its cardinality or anything like that. If I just take all the ... I have
all the ones that are finite, take care of them by the way I was just telling
you and then just have this one big class that’s infinite and there would
probably be an infinite number of those and, but could I really do that with
an iterative process? … Yeah, I know it. It isn’t going to be possible. Well,
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why isn’t it? Because if I can do the natural numbers, I’m not sure how
I would do that unless I just ... plunked them all in there and sort of did
some hand waving.

Cecil begins with the action of forming small finite sets of natural numbers.
He tries to extend this to an iterative process but realizes that his description
fails to yield infinite subsets of N .
Cecil:

No. The set of all subsets. Ahh, you start to build it but then almost
immediately, back off because it’s ... there’s a process that you could go
through. OK, here’s {1} , and here’s {2} and {3} . Those are all going to be
in there, then {1,2} will be in there and {1,2,3} will be in there and I’m
always ... at the beginning. I haven’t really looked at ... I haven’t thought
about this before ... infinite subsets, I’m still ... I’m caught back here at
finite subsets but I haven’t said ... and all the odd numbers are a subset of
... and all the even numbers are a subset, and multiples of three are a subset
and just the idea that, boy, it’s a whopper and, uh, I know how to form ...
you know if somebody gives me one of these sets I can say whether it’s a
subset or not.

Claudia and Ranae tried to construct iterative processes where, for each step

n , one lists all of the subsets of that cardinality. Cecil made a similar attempt,
but was less successful. Ian, as noted in the section on Mental Images,
constructed the power set P({1,2,..., n}) for each step n . Like Claudia, Ranae,
and Cecil, his construction only yielded the finite elements of P (N ) . However,
unlike Claudia, Ranae, and Cecil, Ian demonstrated reluctance throughout his
interview to see any infinite process as complete, whether building a mental
structure for N , or attempting to build a mental structure for P (N ) .
One subject, Kathryn, alluded to encapsulation. In the excerpt below, she
talks about a “giant leap past recursion”:
Kathryn:

Think to talk about P (N ) in its entirety you have to make a kind of giant
leap past recursion. Even to talk about one non-defined object of P (N )
needs such a leap, but maybe not such a large one, since the relevant axiom
there is countable choice, which is much more limited ontologically than the
power set axiom.

Like the other subjects, though, she does not describe any process structure
to which the mechanism of encapsulation could be applied. Thus, we cannot say
what mental structures she may have constructed.
For the set N , our subjects did what an APOS analysis calls for.
They started with actions, a source for a finite iterative process, which they
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constructed using the mechanism of interiorization. They applied actions to
a completed infinite process and encapsulated that process to yield N as the
transcendent object. While the BMI could be used to explain the construction
of an infinite iterative process, APOS Theory appeared to align more
closely with the subjects’ tendencies to apply actions to the process structures
they formed.
For P (N ) , none of the subjects successfully constructed mental structures
for the set P (N ) . Several tried to construct iterative processes, but they soon
realized the futility of their attempts. Kathryn noted that P (N ) might be a giant
step past recursion, but her insight did not help her to build a mental structure for
the set P (N ) .

4.6. Mathematical formalism
Several of our subjects referred to formal definitions and theorems in their
attempts to create meaning for the set N . As an illustration, we include
below an excerpt from Quinn, who offers an informal definition of the natural
numbers N , and then suggests use of the Peano Postulates or the successor
function to construct the entire set.
Quinn:
I:
Quinn:
I:
Quinn:
I:

Quinn:
I:
Quinn:

A string of discretely placed dots on the line that continue. I don’t try to
envision the end of the line.
Right, and how would you think about actually constructing, enumerating
the natural numbers? How would you sort of get them?
I’m not sure, if you mean something like the Peano Postulates.
If I said to you, so what are the natural numbers?
I guess I would just say the numbers that people learned to count with in
their earliest years, 1, 2, 3, and so forth.
Ahh, yeah. That’s the point I was trying to get, 1, 2, 3 and so forth. So if you
thought of putting that all together you might start with nothing, with the
empty set, and you might throw in 1 and what would you do next?
Throw in a successor, and then a successor, and so forth.
Right, and what does that have to do with the natural numbers?
Well, I think what we are creating are the natural numbers.

Quinn used the number line, a visual perception, to elicit a sequence of
numerals, a mental image, to serve as a source for construction of the set
of natural numbers. He then coordinated the process of finite enumeration
with a formal structure, in this case, Peano’s Postulates, to see the natural
numbers in their totality. Two other subjects applied formalism in similar ways.
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They started with some version of counting or successively adding 1, and then
applied rigorous mathematical mechanisms such as induction or recursion to
construct the set N .
This situation contrasted sharply with what we found for P (N ) . Most of the
subjects attempted to list subsets, generally starting with small subsets and then
increasing cardinality. After realizing that such processes would only yield
the finite subsets of N , several participants made references to the use of
formalism. For example, Kathryn referred to the ZFC axioms, while Quinn
suggested the Schroeder-Bernstein theorem (which, we note, is not about P (N ) ).
Despite several attempts, no one described any mathematical structure that
would obtain the set of all of the subsets of N . Kathryn came closest:
Kathryn:

The intuition that you should be able to talk about all subsets of N came
much earlier than the binary tree, out of a kind of naive philosophical
intuition and not out of any formality. That is, P (N ) should exist, because if
you can talk about one subset you should be able to talk about all of them.
And, of course, backing up the naive intuition, one of the ZFC axioms is
that if X is a set, so is P(X ) .

Kathryn starts with subsets of N as a source for her thinking and, as Tall
(2001) suggests, proposes formalization in an axiomatic system as a mechanism
to establish the existence of P (N ) . However, her application of this ZFC
axiom did not lead to any knowledge about the structure of P (N ) . Similarly,
Quinn alludes to formal ideas as the basis for his thinking about P (N ) , but
he is not able to construct or recall any formal structures that inform his
understanding.
Quinn:

I:
Quinn:
I:
Quinn:

Even when I was trying to get the full thing organized in my mind, I think I
tended to think in terms of classical results and things that had been shown
and which sets were larger than which other sets. And the SchroederBernstein theorem comes in here somewhere. Don’t ask me to quote it right
now, but I remember thinking that it gave certain organization to my
thinking process.
So you used some of the formal results of mathematics.
Yeah, exactly. Without that impetus, I can’t imagine that I ever would have
actually sat down and really thought about the set of all subsets of anything.
But now that you have that impetus, you know those theorems or at least
you did. Can you think about all of the subsets of the natural numbers?
Well, I said as a theoretical construct, I know that, you know it’s another
one of those things where you can give examples until you are weary of the
process and withdraw [laughter].
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Quinn’s reference to Schroeder-Bernstein concerns the cardinality of
infinite sets, so application of this theorem certainly would not lead to a rigorous
formulation of the structure of P (N ) . Nevertheless, use of Schroeder-Bernstein
gives evidence of Quinn’s attempt to apply formal ideas to describe P (N ) ,
something MacLane (1986) and Tall (2001) propose.
Doris also refers to use of formalism. After disclosing that her only
experience with P (N ) was restricted to cardinality issues, she notes that her
perception of P (N ) is reduced to “just the definition.”
Doris:

I:
Doris:

The main time that I would deal with the power set of the natural numbers is
when I’m dealing with cardinality. So the first thing I’d think of is the
cardinality of it, which is bigger, and that whole question.
The uncountability?
Yeah, so as soon as you said that, I’m like oh! yes, that’s the ... I really think
I just ... as far as how I conceive of it, it’s just the definition.

Despite an emphasis on formalism, Doris did not build a mental structure to
derive meaning from the formalism in a manner suggested by Dubinsky (2000).
Instead, she only saw a “quagmire.”
Again, the subjects’ thinking about N contrasted with their thinking about
P (N ) . For N , several of the subjects appeared to build mental structures using
formalism in ways predicted by MacLane (1986) and Tall (2001). For P (N ) ,
the attempts to use formalism failed. In particular, Doris, who mentioned the
definition, made no attempt to apply the mechanisms of APOS Theory, as
Dubinsky (2000) suggests, to build a mental structure for the set.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our research question considered the issue, unaddressed in the literature, of
whether individual understanding of the uncountable set P (N ) can be described
using a constructivist perspective. Specifically, do individuals construct
mental structures for the set P (N ) that both amplify the meaning of the formal
definition and go beyond the mere assertion that P (N ) is not countable? To help
answer this question, we asked eight mathematicians to explain their thinking
about P (N ) . We analyzed their responses using different perspectives. We
deemed these perspectives constructivist, because we could identify certain
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mental structures, sources from which those structures develop, and mechanisms
that lead to their development. Our definition of the term ‘mental structure’
was not precise. Instead, it provided a framework for consideration of the
perspectives used in the analysis. The list of perspectives was not exhaustive, but
representative; it covered a wide range of cognitive activities, and encompassed
all of our subjects’ responses. Furthermore, each perspective either has been, or
could possibly be, applied to explain individual thinking about countable sets, in
this instance, the set of natural numbers N . Even though the set N was
not the focus of our investigation, we reported our subjects’ thinking about N to
serve as a baseline, or backdrop, for our analysis of P (N ) . The data illustrated a
sharp contrast. For the set N , our subjects evoked, or built, mental structures for
N . Each subject’s thinking could be described using one or more of the
perspectives we considered.
For P (N ) , the situation was just the opposite. Although our subjects made
valiant attempts to build mental structures, in support of Burton’s (2001)
finding that mathematicians value meaningful, connected, and insightful
explanations, their attempts were unsuccessful. Their responses were
generally limited
to vague mental images, intuitions of what P (N ) is not,
failed attempts to construct processes, and misapplications or incomplete
applications of formalism. These results, especially in contrast to what was
reported for N , indicate strong support for the following empirical claim: until
further advances can be made in our understanding of P (N ) , absence of
evidence of mental structures for P (N ) is evidence of absence of those
structures. In particular, explanations for the meaning of the word “all” in an
uncountable context, beyond the assertion that it is non-iterative, did not arise.
In summary of the perspectives, no subject offered evidence of a visual
perception to which other mental mechanisms could be applied to build a mental
structure for P (N ) . On one hand, this was not surprising. As Lakoff and Núñez
(2000) note, on-going processes, even if continuous, are conceived iteratively.
Yet, no purely iterative image could give rise to an uncountable entity. On the
other hand, the real line is a visual representation of an uncountable set that
corresponds with P (N ) . However, it is not clear how an image of the real line
would give greater meaning to the word “all.”
At least two mental images arose in descriptions of P (N ) . Doris referred to
P (N ) as a “quagmire,” and Kathryn stated that P (N ) was “very, very big, in
some sense unknowable.” Both images suggest “larger than countable,” but
neither would likely motivate new experiences that would inspire development
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of new images that would make more precise the meaning of “all” in the formal
definition.
Intuitions develop through repeated experiences that leave mental traces.
Our subjects repeatedly used iteration in their attempts to build mental structures
for P (N ) . Although their attempts failed, spontaneous realizations of the futility
of their approaches abounded. Yet, these intuitions informed a notion of what
P (N ) is not; they did not serve as sources for mental structures for P (N ) .
Several subjects tried to apply formalism. Doris and Quinn’s attempts were
unsuccessful. Kathryn quoted one of the ZFC axioms, but the axiom to which
she referred, only establishes the existence of the set P (N ) (given the
assumption that N is a set). Mathematically, establishment of existence is
crucial. From a constructivist perspective, it is insufficient.
When asked to describe the set P (N ) , six of the eight subjects listed
elements, and four of the eight actually tried to construct iterative processes. The
processes were of two types: to each step n, either the subject assigned all
subsets of cardinality n , or the subject constructed the power set P({1,2,..., n}) .
For either case, one only obtains the finite elements of P (N ) . Each subject
realized this, but none could make further progress. All of their attempts, at
least in terms of the transition from finite to infinite iteration, could be
interpreted either by APOS Theory, or the Basic Metaphor of Infinity.
An important finding is that our subjects did not appear to reconceptualize
resultant states metaphorically. For the set N , the subjects applied actions to
iterative processes. This supports research conducted by Brown et al. (in press),
who discovered that their students needed to apply actions to iterative processes
in order to correctly construct resultant states. Various reviewers (e.g, Dubinsky,
1999; Gold, 2001; Madden, 2001) have objected to some of the metaphors
Lakoff and Núñez use to explain mathematical thinking. Schiralli and Sinclair
(2003) concur. They explain that Lakoff and Núñez’ method of mathematical
idea analysis supplies plausible, humanistic explanations for the origin of
conventional mathematical ideas but is insufficient to describe the formation
of personal conceptions that constitute the realm of ideational mathematics, the
realm of individual mental structures that individuals form to understand
mathematical concepts. Our findings support this claim. However, this does not
mean that our subjects did not give evidence of metaphorical thinking. Their
attempts to construct P (N ) iteratively reflected a tendency to reconceptualize
uncountable entities as countable ones. This supports Lakoff and Núñez’
assertion that human beings tend to think of infinite entities, even continuous

120

CINDY STENGER ET AL.

ones, as repeated processes. From Tall’s (1992) perspective, iteration may be a
cognitive root for the mental development of uncountable structures, or, to use
the language of this report, a source for the construction of mental structures for
P (N ) .
In the case of APOS Theory, mental construction of P (N ) , as with any
mathematical entity, requires an appropriate process mental structure and a
desired action on that process that will lead to encapsulation and construction of
P (N ) as the transcendent object. In the case of one aspect of countable infinity,
infinite iterative processes, that question has been addressed by prior research.
Brown et al. (in press) offered an empirically-based, APOS theoretical
description of the mental construction of infinite iterative processes and their
states at infinity. The authors describe how individuals use the mental
mechanisms of interiorization and coordination to construct an iterative process,
and detail how the mechanism of encapsulation leads to the mental construction
of the state at infinity, which is conceived as a transcendent object. Whether
APOS Theory can be extended to describe the cognition of problem
solving situations involving uncountable infinity remains an open question
requiring further empirical research. However, the subjects’ tendencies to
construct iterative processes to build a mental structure for P (N ) , although not
successful, could be a starting point. In our future research, we will analyze the
iterative constructions that seemed natural to our subjects and try to find ways of
enhancing them so that they do lead to a process whose encapsulation will be
P (N ) . The problem is to find the steps that will pass beyond the finite subsets
of N to include infinite subsets. One promising direction we will explore is to
look at the various Computer Science algorithms for traversing trees. Although
these are all designed for finite trees, one or more of them might have useful
extensions to a process for an infinite tree.
As we search for a process whose encapsulation is P (N ) , we will continue
to observe students and mathematicians to see if our sample is typical or if
there are mental processes appropriate for P (N ) in the minds of mathematicians
and students. We will consider that an individual has a mental structure for
P (N ) when he or she can give an explanation of this set that goes beyond its
formal definition, or explain the meaning of “all” in terms other than synonyms.
We will also be able to observe a mental structure (or lack thereof) when an
individual is working with mathematical situations that involve P (N ) such as
in proving that it is uncountable, or showing it has the same cardinality as the set
of real numbers.
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This study also raised the question of the general applicability of
constructivism. As constructivists ourselves, we believe that individuals
build mental structures to make sense of mathematical situations. This study
has not changed our belief, but it does raise the question of whether certain
mathematical concepts defy a constructivist interpretation. Even when faced
with pure formalism, Dubinsky (2000) argues that individuals make certain
mental constructions to make sense of purely formal notions. Our subjects made
such attempts for P (N ) , but no one was successful. Thus, the results of this
study cast some doubt on the claim made by Dubinsky (2000). Only further
empirical research can determine whether this is in fact the case.
For some concepts, those principally studied by research mathematicians,
determination of underlying mental structures may not be as crucial. For the set
P (N ) though, the situation is different because it is a topic of study in the
undergraduate curriculum. If the most that a mathematician can communicate to
her or his students about the meaning of P (N ) is that it consists of all subsets of
N , without further elaboration of the meaning of “all,” then it is hard to see how
students can develop conceptions of uncountable sets such as P (N ) that go
beyond empty formalism. As we indicated in the Introduction, Burton (2001)
notes that current disillusionment with mathematics teaching arises from a lack
of meaningful explanations. We agree and note that in order to provide such
explanations for infinite sets, the teacher, indeed the mathematical professional,
needs to identify or develop meaningful connections for countable and
uncountable sets. While this may have been done for the former, this report
shows that this has not yet been accomplished for the latter.
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